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PLANT RELOCATION OR PARTIAL TERMINATION
-THE DUTY TO DECISION-BARGAIN
THOMAS J. SCHWARZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope of the DiscussionT HE exercise of sound business discretion may, under certain condi-
tions, require that an employer move his plant to another location or
close down a part of his operation. Whether "removal" or "partial ter-
mination" is utilized, the employer must "effect-bargain," i.e., bargain
with respect to such items as pensions and severance pay.' This duty to
bargain2 exists irrespective of the employer's motivation in reaching the
decision, but if the employer's sole motivation and the foreseeable conse-
quences are to "chill" unionism, his action also constitutes a violation of
section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act?
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. See cases cited notes 7 & 8 infra.
2. The duty to bargain is not a duty to reach a decision, but merely to reach an im-
passe. After impasse, management may unilaterally act. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742
(1962). Moreover, the Board cannot force management to agree. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964), which states: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,
That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude
an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, main-
tained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to
require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, which-
ever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in
section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement,
the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in
such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such
an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against
an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and
conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership .. ." (emphasis deleted).
See, e.g., Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965), enforced in part, 374 F.2d 29S (D.C.
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Although the foregoing principles are well-established, there exists
some uncertainty concerning the employer's duty to bargain over the
actual decision, motivated solely by economic considerations, to partially
terminate or remove. Accordingly, this article will be confined to a dis-
cussion of the employer's duty to "decision-bargain."
B. The Background
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees." 4 "To bargain collectively" is defined in section 8(d) as:
[T]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession .... 5
The underlying question, therefore, is whether removal or partial ter-
mination is a "term and condition" of employment, and the question
necessitates a degree of historical analysis.6
Before the advent of the Act, an employer had unfettered discretion
to do as he pleased; its enactment, however, immediately restricted his
freedom. The earliest decisions dealing with removal and partial termi-
nation upheld his right to remove or partially terminate so long as he
bargained with the union over the effects of his decision, but there was
no duty to bargain over the actual decision itself.7 This dichotomy be-
tween decision-bargaining and effect-bargaining existed unquestioned:
It is recognized that an employer may lawfully discontinue, reduce, or change its
operations for any reason whatsoever, good or bad, sound or unsound, in its sole
discretion, and without censorship from the Board, provided only that the employer's
action is not motivated by a purpose to interfere with and to defeat its employees'
union activities. If the latter purpose is the true purpose, it is unlawful.8
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 980 (1969); Note, Plant Relocation, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1062
(1967); 79 Harv. L. Rev. 855 (1966); 64 Mich. L. Rev. 741 (1966). See also Diaper Jean
Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Tredway, 222 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1955).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
5. Id. § 158(d) (emphasis added).
6. For an historical treatment of this subject see Note, Duty to Bargain, 55 Geo. L.J. 879
(1967); Note, Plant Removals, 38 Temp. L.Q. 299 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Bickford Shoes, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1954); Brown Truck & Trailer
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Brown-
McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941). In California Portland Cement Co., 101
N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952), supplemented, 103 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1953), the Board ordered the
parties to bargain over an economic removal, notwithstanding the employer's contention
that the union had failed to exhaust its remedies under the grievance procedures established
by the contract.
8. Eva-Ray Dress Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 361, 376 (1950) (Trial Examiner's Report)
(footnote omitted), modified per curiam, 191 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1951).
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Thus the rule appeared to be that an employer could make whatever op-
erational changes he desired without decision-bargaining, so long as he
had no anti-union animus. There were, however, prophetic indications
to the contrary. In Gerity Whitaker Co.P the Board, while not expressly
so holding, appeared to require decision-bargaining with respect to a
removal. The Board noted:
The removal... was such a drastic and crucial change in Gerity Whitaker's employ-
ment conditions that the refusal to bargain inherent in such removal, when presented
as an accomplished fact, could not be cured by the bargaining that subsequently
occurred in regard to the employment at (the new plant] of some employees laid off
at [the old plant] especially since the Geritys failed to carry out in full the under-
standing reached in connection with this negotiation.' 0
In other words, the Board was indicating that when the union is pre-
sented with a fait accompli as to the decision, effect-bargaining is insuf-
ficient.
II. INITUAL INROADS INTO MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Railroad
Telegraphers v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.' In that case, the
union demanded bargaining over a contract provision which would have
required union consent before any employment position could be abol-
ished. The provision sought by the union stated: "'No position in exist-
ence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued except by
agreement between the carrier and the organization [union].' '312 The
Court held that the provision related to the employees' "conditions of
employment" and, as such, was a proper subject for mandatory collective
bargaining.la Although the case was decided under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,14 it was to have a great effect on the future decisions of the Board.
This effect appeared in To=n & Country Manufacturing Co.,' decided
by the Board in 1962. Faced with a situation where the employer had
unilaterally 6 subcontracted work previously performed by the union, the
Board held: "[T]he elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons,
9. 33 NL.R.B. 393 (1941), modified per curiam, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 US. 763, rehearing denied, 318 US. 801 (1943).
10. 33 N.L.R.B. at 407. The Board ordered reinstatement at either the old or the new
plant, but did not order reestablishment of the old plant. Id. at 420.
11. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
12. Id. at 332.
13. Id. at 336. Mandatory subjects are those which must be bargained over if one party
so requests. Permissive subjects may be bargained over if both parties agree. See 2 CCH Lab.
L. Rep. ff 3020.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
15. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
16. "Unilaterally" means without having bargained with the union.
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is a matter within the statutory phrase 'other terms and conditions of
employment' and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining."' 7
In so deciding, the Board noted that bargaining would not restrain an
employer nor obligate him to yield to a union's demand, but would lead
to the "candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and management
[which] frequently results in their resolution with attendant benefit to
both sides.""' Consequently, "[blusiness operations may profitably con-
tinue and jobs may be preserved."19
In 1964, the Supreme Court approved Town & Country through its
decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.20 The issue be-
fore the Court was the same as that in Town & Country, i.e., subcon-
tracting. The employer had hired an independent contractor to do plant
maintenance work which previously had been done by union employees.
No change had been made other than this substitution of independent
for unit workers. The Court, citing Railroad Telegraphers, found that
since subcontracting related to the "terms and conditions of employ-
ment," there was a duty to decision-bargain. Although the decision
was expressly limited to subcontracting, the Court pointed out: "The
words [terms and conditions of employment] even more plainly cover
termination of employment which ... necessarily results from the con-
tracting out of work .... "21 Enumerating the pertinent facts upon which
it based its decision, the Court observed:
The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance work did not alter the
Company's basic operation. The maintenance work still had to be performed in the
plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing
employees with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar
conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the employer to bargain about the
matter would not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business.22
The Court also indicated that since the Company's subcontracting was
directly related to topics traditionally suitable for collective bargaining,
there should be an opportunity for discussion of those issues.3
In a concurring opinion, Justices Stewart, Douglas and Harlan indi-
cated that the majority "most assuredly does not decide that every
managerial decision which necessarily terminates an individual's em-
17. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1027.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See Smith, Subcontracting and Union Management Legal and
Contractual Relations, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 1272 (1966); Feldesman, How Issues of Sub-
contracting and Plant Removal Are Handled by the National Labor Relations Board, 19
Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 253 (1966).
21. 379 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 213.
23. Id. at 215.
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ployment is subject to the duty to bargain."24 They further noted that
"[d]ecisions concerning the... basic scope of the enterprise are not in
themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect
... may be necessarily to terminate employment. '2
Indeed, Fibreboard does not make all forms of unilateral subcontract-
ing unlawful. For example, later Board decisions indicate that no bar-
gaining is required when the subcontracting does not have a significant,
detrimental effect on the employees. -2 1
A year after Fibreboard the Supreme Court, in Textile Workers Union
v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,2 7 held that an employer has an absolute
right to terminate the operation of his entire business, even because of
anti-union animus, without violating section 8(a) (3) of the Act. The
Court noted that the case did not present the question of an employer's
right to terminate his business for non-discriminatory reasons,28 and fur-
ther observed:
A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants
to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without
the dearest manifestation of legislative intent.... 2D
The decision was the result of a balancing of the respective interests of
the employer and the union. The Court indicated that while certain busi-
ness decisions might interfere with the rights of unions, a violation should
be found only when the interference outweighed the "business justifica-
tion for the employer's action." 0
Darlington, it should be stressed, dealt with the question of whether
an employer violates section 8(a) (3) of the Act when he closes down all
24. Id. at 218 (concurring opinion).
25. Id. at 223 (concurring opinion).
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. King Radio Corp., 416 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1007 (1970); Union Carbide Corp., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (Sept. 19, 1969); Flurocarbon
Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (Nov. 30, 1967); American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965).
Nor is bargaining required when subcontracting is used as a stop-gap measure during a strike.
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Abbott Pub. Co., 331
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964); Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
27. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). For a decision prior to Darlington holding that an employer
cannot totally terminate with anti-union animus, see Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963),
modified, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964). Contra, N.L.R.B. v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 21S F.2d
908 (8th Cir. 1954).
28. 380 US. at 269.
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id. at 269. It is not an automatic violation even if foreseeable consequences may
be to chill union activities. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.. 667 (1961). However,
it is improper to partially terminate during an unfair labor practice strike. Gopher Aviation,
Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 1698 (1966), enforcement denied on other grounds, 402 F.2d 176 (8th
Cir. 1968).
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of his operations because of anti-union animus. It held that no section
8(a) (3) violation will occur even if the shut down is discriminatorily
motivated. In dictum, however, the Court also indicated that an employer
could totally terminate for any reason whatsoever without violating sec-
tion 8(a) (5). Moreover, insofar as there is less than a total cessation,
Darlington holds that a partial termination will violate section 8(a) (3)
of the Act "if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the re-
maining plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably
have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect.""1 Darling-
ton did not deal with a partial termination for purely economic reasons,
and the Board has held it to be inapplicable to such a situation."
Thus, the outlines of the controversy have been set. Railroad Teleg-
raphers states that termination of employment is a mandatory topic of
collective bargaining; Darlington indicates that an employer has an ab-
solute right to terminate his entire operation; and Fibreboard and Town
& Country hold that a decision to subcontract requires bargaining, im-
pliedly indicating that the "business justification" for subcontracting may
not outweigh the interference with the employees' rights. Therefore,
based upon the balancing of interests principles of Darlington and Fibre-
board, a requirement of decision-bargaining in cases of economic removal
or partial termination should be made only if the interference with the
employees' rights outweighs "the business justification for the employer's
action."83
III. TYPICAL CASES
A. The Board-Court Conflict
This article might have been entitled "The Courts v. The Board."
While there are exceptions, the later cases in the areas of removal and
partial termination exhibit a dichotomy depending upon the forum. 4
Since the Town & Country decision, the Board has consistently held that
a failure to decision-bargain in cases of partial termination or removal
constitutes a section 8(a) (5) violation."8 The courts, on the other hand,
31. 380 U.S. at 275.
32. See, e.g., Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 674 (1965), enforced, 368 F.2d
549 (9th Cir. 1966).
33. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Cooper Thermometer Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1902 (1966), enforced in part, 376
F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967); Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 619, enforcement
denied, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960), enforced
in part, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
35. See cases cited note 66 infra.
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have for the most part refused to require decision-bargaining even after
the Fibreboard decision.3 6
The Board's reasoning is logical:
Termination of employment is a proper sub-
ject for mandatory collective bargaining;'-
partial termination or removal causes termi-
nation of employment;
therefore, partial termination or removal is a proper
subject for mandatory collective bargaining s
In other words, it is argued, Fibreboard is but one example of action
which causes termination of employment. Since the Supreme Court in
Fibreboard was concerned with termination of employment, other actions
which cause such termination should also be mandatory subjects for
bargaining.
Examination of a few exemplary cases will aid in clarification. For the
purposes of this article, the cases are divided into two groups. In the
first group, the employer has no plans to carry on the operation. The
second group consists of cases where the employer does intend to con-
tinue the operation, but plans to substitute other employees.
B. Group I Cases
In Royal Plating & Polishing Co01 the employer, while engaged in
contract negotiations with the union, failed to disclose its intention to
close down the plant. The employer signed an agreement with the union
and, after laying off a few employees, notified the union of its intention
to terminate. The Board affirmed the Trial Examiner's finding that the
employer was under a duty to notify the union and negotiate possible
alternatives to the partial termination. The Board noted:
Had Respondent consulted with the Union in this case, the latter at least would have
36. The Board and the courts apparently believe that there is very little practical dif-
ference between removal and partial termination. From the point of view of the union,
both result in termination of employment; from management's point of view, both are
operational changes.
37. Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
38. There is no duty to bargain with respect to a total sale of the business. Martin
Marietta Corp., 159 N.LJR.B. 905 (1966). There apparently is such a duty with respect to a
partial sale. meld Hardware & Furniture Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1401 (1966). If the sale is
illusory, however, and the old employer is actually still in control, there is a section 8(a) (3)
violation. See generally American Trailer & Equip. Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 867 (1965); NLRB
v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961).
39. 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), on remand, 152 N.L.R.B. 619, enforcement denied, 350
F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965), supplemented, 160 N.L.R.B. 990 (1966).
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been able to negotiate concerning effects on employees of Respondent's decision to
close down the operations .... Moreover, the Union might have been able to advance
a solution to the problems confronting Respondent, however remote that possibility
may have been 40
After the Darlington decision, the court of appeals remanded Royal
Plating for consideration of Darlington's effect on the decision. On re-
mand the Board, citing Railroad Telegraphers and Fibreboard, held that
Darlington did not change the result because Royal Plating involved a
partial termination only.4' It is interesting to note, however, that one
month after Royal Plating closed down its first plant, it then terminated
its remaining plant. The Board reasoned that because there was no in-
tention to close the second plant at the time that the first was closed, it
could not be considered a total cessation. In concluding, the Board,
balancing the interests of the respective parties, stated:
[RJespondent did not merely withdraw its capital from the enterprise; Respondent also
deprived employees of jobs in which they had invested years of work, had built up
seniority rights, and may have had other rights, all of which became relatively worth-
less upon discontinuance of the operation of the plant. 42
The court of appeals was unimpressed and squarely held:
We conclude that an employer faced with the economic necessity of either moving or
consolidating the operations of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the
union respecting its decision to shut down. 43
While the court noted that this was a failing company, there is no reason
to believe that its decision was limited to such a circumstance. It cited
the concurring opinion of Justices Stewart, Douglas and Harlan in Fibre-
board, wherein it was indicated that decisions involving capital invest-
ment were not subject to mandatory bargaining. Royal Plating would
seem, therefore, to be an example of the conflict between the Board and
the courts. The Board weighs the rights of the employees as heavily as
the capital of the employer and demands bargaining; the courts' scales
are tipped by the investment of capital.
One month after the first Royal Plating decision, the Board decided
William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.4 4 The employer in
this case lost all but one of the guard contracts in a specific area, and it
became economically infeasible to continue the remaining contract. Burns
then unilaterally cancelled it. The Trial Examiner and the Board found
a section 8(a) (5) violation, but did not discuss whether any solution
40. 148 N.L.R.B. at 547.
41. 152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965). The Board ordered back pay.
42. Id. at 622-23.
43. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965) (footnote
omitted).
44. 148 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964), enforcement denied, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 39
1970] PLANT RELOCATION"
might have resulted from bargaining. 5 On appeal, the Board argued that
Fibreboard called for the enforcement of its order." The court held
Fibreboard inapplicable, noting that there had been a total cessation of
area operations and that no subcontracting was involved. The court
found instead that Darlington should be applied, quoting: "'[A] partial
closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3) if motivated by a
purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants . .. . ",
Darlington, the court apparently reasoned, meant that without anti-
union animus a partial closing could never constitute an unfair labor
practice. As previously indicated, however, Darlington was specifying the
requirements for a section 8(a) (3) (anti-union animus) violation and
was not concerned with the duty to bargain specified in section 8(a) (5).
Thus the Burns court narrowly defined the holding in Fibreboard and
broadly construed Darlington in order to reach its conclusion.48
C. Group 11 Cases
In the Group I cases, as evidenced by Royal Plating and Burns, the
employer did not intend to carry on operations with independent con-
tractors or with new employees at another location. The Group II cases
do present these situations.
In Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.49 the company, for economic purposes, uni-
laterally and without any notification to the union closed down a cheese
processing facility and contracted to purchase processed cheese. The
45. The Board issued a cease and desist order and, in addition, ordered effect-bargaining,
bargaining over the resumption of operations, and back pay. See also Interstate Tool Co.,
177 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (June 30, 1969) (back pay and bargaining ordered); Senco, Inc., 177
N.L.R.B. No. 102 (June 30, 1969) (back pay ordered); Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 176
N._LR.B. No. 102 (June 17, 1969) (preferential hiring list ordered); Apex Linen Serv,
Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 305 (1965) (back pay and bargaining ordered).
46. NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897, 901 (8th
Cir. 1965).
47. Id. at 902.
48. The, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals frequently relies on Darlington. In Adams
Dairy Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), the Board found a violation of section 8(a) (5) where
the employer terminated its distribution operations and gave the work to independent con-
tractors. On appeal, the order was modified. 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963). After Fibre-
board, the judgment of the court was vacated and remanded. 379 U.S. 644 (1965). On
remand, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Fibreboard, holding that Adams
involved a basic operational change and dted Darlington as its authority. 350 Fa2d ioS,
111-12 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.. 1011 (1966). See Comment, Labor Law: Man-
agement Decision to Terminate Delivery Operations Not a Mandatory Collective Bargaining
Topic, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 752 (1966).
49. 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced as modified, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966), supplemented, 170 N.L.R.B. No. 198 (April 23, 1968), enforced,
413 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1969). See also NLRE v. Northwestern Pub. Co., 343 F.2d S21 (7th
Cir. 1965).
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Board held that the action of the employer was in violation of section
8(a)(5) and ordered bargaining over reactivation of the facility. The
Board based its finding on the possibility that decision-bargaining might
have led to a resolution of the problem wherein not all employees would
have been laid off.5" The court, discussing the clear economic benefits that
accrued to Winn-Dixie by reason of the unilateral partial termination,
nevertheless agreed with the Board and held that the processor was per-
forming the same job as the unit employees, necessitating consultation
and bargaining with the union.51 Because of the economic benefits of the
partial termination, however, the court held that bargaining over the
resumption of the facility would have been useless. Consequently, that
portion of the Board's decision which ordered reactivation-bargaining
was deleted.52
In Ozark Trailers, Inc.,5 the employer' unilaterally closed its Ozark
plant, which manufactured truck bodies for its Mobilfreeze plant."" The
latter then contracted with an independent company for the manufacture
of truck bodies. Thus, as in Winn-Dixie, there was a substitution of
independent employees for unit workers. The Board, however, treated
the case as a partial termination rather than as subcontracting. In balanc-
ing the respective interests, it stated:
[T]ermination, just as contracting out, is a problem of vital concern to both labor
and management, and it Would promote the fundamental purpose of the Act to bring
that problem within the collective-bargaining framework set out in the Act.50
A recent case, NLRB v. Drapery Manufacturing Co.,5 T exhibits very
clearly the several disagreements between the Board and the courts. A
single integrated employer, for purely economic reasons, unilaterally
partially terminated its operations and was planning to contract with an-
other for its requirements. The Board held that there was a section
8(a) (5) violation .5 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, with Judge
50. 147 N.L.R.B. at 790.
51. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
935 (1966).
52. 361 F.2d at 517.
53. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
54. The Board held that three corporations constituted one employer. Id.
55. See Comment, Labor Law-National Labor Relations Act--Section 8(a) (5) Im-
poses Duty to Bargain Decision to Close Part of Manufacturing Operation, 36 U. Cinn. L.
Rev. 555 (1967); Comment, Labor Law-Employer Must Bargain About an Economically
Motivated Decision to Close a Portion of Its Operations, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 932 (1967). See
also McGregor Printing Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 938 (1967); International Paper Co., 150
N.L.R.B. 1252 (1965).
56. 161 N.L.R.B. at 567.
57. 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970).
58. Drapery Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 199 (April 22, 1968), enforced In part, denied
in part, 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970).
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(now Justice) Blackmun in the majority, held that there was no duty to
bargain. The court distinguished Fibreboard by noting that in the instant
case there was a capital investment, and the work would no longer be
"controlled" by the company. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on this question, Justices Stewart, Douglas, Harlan (concurring in
Fibreboard), and now Justice Blackmun, all agree that there is no duty to
decision-bargain where there is a capital investment, as opposed to mere
subcontracting. Assuming, therefore, that one other Justice agrees,"' and
that none of these four changes his mind,60 the Board may ultimately find
itself overruled by the Court.
Substitution of employees also takes place where there is a removal of
the plant. Instead of substituting an independent contractor, removal
substitutes new employees for the old employees." For example, in
McLoughlin Manufacturing Corp."2 the employer, for purely economic
reasons, decided to move his plant but failed to notify and bargain with
the union. After the move took place, the union filed charges. The Board
held that there was a section 8(a) (5) violation but, since the move was
irreversible, only ordered bargaining over the effects of the move. Back
pay was also ordered.63
A similar decision appears in Weltronik Co. v. NLRB.6 4 The employer
transferred work to another plant, located three miles away, without
written notice to the union and without transferring any employees. The
court, citing Fibreboard and enforcing the Board's order,' held that "the
company had the statutory duty to give the union the opportunity to
bargain about the removal .... MG
59. Five Justices joined in the Fibreboard majority opinion, of whom only three are
still on the Court (one Justice took no part in the decision).
60. Justice Stewart has been known to change his mind. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 US. 235 (1970) (concurring opinion).
61. Unless, of course, the removal is to a nearby location. If this is the case, the same
employees might operate the new plant and no section 8(a) (5) problem would arise. Twenty-
seven miles, however, is too far. Cooper Thermometer Co., 160 N.L.ILB. 1902 (1966), en-
forced in part, 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967).
62. 182 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (June 1, 1970). See also McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B.
140 (1967).
63. -See also Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (June 30, 1969). Where the
removal is a violation, the Board has ordered moving expenses. See Great Ad. & Pac. Tea
Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1 (1963).
64. 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U .S. 938 (1970), enforcing 173
N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Oct. 21, 1968). See also Viking of Minneapolis, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 7
(June 18, 1968).
65. The Board ordered back pay, but did not require reopening the old plant.
66. 419 F.2d at 1123. The following are also Group II cases: Dan Dee W. Va. Corp,
180 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (Jan. 5, 1970) (employer changed distribution so drivers became in-
dependent contractors); Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Dec. 15, 1969) (employer sub-
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IV. DEFENSES
While no recent cases hold that it is unnecessary to decision-bargain
in cases of removal or partial termination, in recent years-perhaps due
to the number of court decisions denying enforcement-the Board has
begun to withdraw from its decision-bargaining requirement. This new
tendency manifests itself in the ease with which the Board finds either a
waiver by the union of its rights or a cure by the employer of its violation.
A. Waiver by the Union
A waiver by the union can arise either at the time of collective bargain-
ing or at the time of removal or partial termination. The former is more
commonplace and appears as a management prerogative clause in the
contract. Thus in Ador Corp.,7 the Board held that there would be no
violation of section 8(a) (5) where the collective bargaining clause re-
served to management the right to partially terminate.08 The management
clause, however, must be specific. The clause is ineffective if it merely
states that management reserves management rights, for the question then
arises as to what constitutes management rights. 9
contracted without decision-bargaining; Board ordered preferential hiring list and back
pay) ; Acme Indus. Prod., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (Dec. 15, 1969) (employer moved plant,
eliminating twenty or more jobs; Board ordered restoration of seniority); Atlanta Daily
World, 179 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (Dec. 9, 1969) (employer subcontracted; Board ordered cessa-
tion of unlawful conduct and bargaining on subcontractual matters); Young Motor Truck
Serv., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 661 (1966) (employer refused to bargain concerning decision to
sell major portion of business; Board ordered reinstatement, preferential hiring list, back
pay and bargaining on decision to close); International Powder Metallurgy Co., 134
N.L.R.B. 1605 (1961) (Board found Company's moving part of plant was evidence of a
section 8(a) (5) violation; since move was also accompanied by evidence of bad faith,
Board ordered bargaining with employees at new plant); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B.
547 (1961), enforced, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962) (Board found Company was "confronted
with a demand by the Union that it sign a new contract which would have increased [the
Company's] costs by an amount in excess of its net income for the preceding year." 133
N.L.R.B. at 551. Nevertheless, Board ordered reinstatement at either old or new plant and,
if necessary, dismissal of employees engaged at new plant, a preferential hiring list, back
pay, and travel and moving expenses). See also NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp.,
380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); Comment, Duty to Bargain on a Decision to Terminate or
Relocate Operations, 25 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 96 (1968). For other cases where the courts
have enforced the Board's order see, e.g., Red Cross Drug Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1245
(7th Cir. 1969) (employer partially terminated in violation of section 8(a) (5); Board
ordered back pay and bargaining); NLRB v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 356 F.2d 955 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966) (duty to decision-bargain).
67. 150 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965).
68. See also Druwhit Metal Prods. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 346 (1965).
69. See, e.g., Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 938 (1970). There is no duty to decision-bargain if the decision is made before the
advent of the union; Keller Indus., Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 197 (April 23, 1968).
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The waiver may also arise by virtue of the union's failure to request
bargaining at a time when it is put on notice of management's intent to
partially terminate or remove. This is exemplified by Shell Oil Co.,Th
where the employer notified the union of its intent to transfer operations
a few days before the transfer. The Board held that the union had waived
its right to demand bargaining by failing to request additional meetings at
a time when the employer's decision was still revocable. Similarly, in
Hearst Corp. (Daily Mirror)," the employer, without notice to the
unions, closed the New York Daily Mirror. The Board first found that
there was a violation of section 8 (a) (5) resulting from Hearst's unilateral
action. Nevertheless, it refused to order reinstatement and restoration of
the status quo because the unions did not request it, because contractual
settlement agreements had been reached on severance pay and other
termination matters, and because Hearst had met its obligation to effect-
bargain.'2
If the above cases do not clearly show a retreat by the Board, the recent
case of Burns Ford, Inc.73 does clearly exhibit this tendency. In Burns,
the employer's sales had declined and, in an effort to decrease losses, it
terminated employment with a week's notice. The union filed a section
8(a) (5) charge. The Trial Examiner found that the notice merely
evidenced a fait accompli. 4 The Board, however, disagreed:
The decision to lay off employees was nude about a week before April 16. There-
after, the number of employees to be laid off, and the method of their selection, was
determined, and the employees and the Union were then informed, on April 16 ....
[T]he announcement [was not] a fait accompli, since it was not to take effect for
another week.75
The Board then indicated that, since there was a week before the layoffs
became effective, there was ample time to bargain and the union had been
lax in not so requesting.
It would appear that Burns is a prime example of the Board's with-
drawal from its prior requirement of decision-bargaining. As the Board
70. 149 N.L.R.B. 305 (1964).
71. 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
72. Id. at 841-42. See United States Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (March 26, 1968)
(union failed to request and therefore waived right to bargain with respect to impending
relocation when its representative saw employer's machines being dismantled) ; Edward Axel
Roffman Assoc., 147 N.L.R.B. 717 (1964) (union waived right to bargain over decision to
relocate when it ignored employer's notification of possibility of move). See also NLRB v.
Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1967); White Consol. Indus., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1593
(1965); Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962); Montgomery Ward & Co, 137
N.L.R.B. 418 (1962).
73. 182 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (May 26, 1970), 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. UI 21,936.
74. See 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. ff 21,936, at 28,193.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
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itself stated, the "decision" to lay off "was made," and even the "num-
ber" and "method of selection" was determined. It is difficult to under-
stand what was left to be discussed had the unions not been tardy. Indeed,
even if the union had immediately demanded bargaining, the probability
is great that nothing could have been accomplished.
The retrogressive direction of the Burns case becomes even clearer
when it is compared with the 1941 decision in Gerity Whitaker Co.70 The
Board in that case held that when a decision was "presented as an ac-
complished fact [it] could not be cured by the bargaining that sub-
sequently occurred in regard to [future] employment . . . of some em-
ployees ... ."I' If a violation cannot be cured by subsequent bargaining,
it is difficult to comprehend how it can be waived by a union's delay.
B. Cure by the Employer
Just as the Board has held that a union may waive its rights, so it has
decided that an employer may cure his breach. Thus, in Hartmann Lug-
gage Co.,78 the employer entered into a subcontracting agreement but bar-
gained with the union while the contract was still executory. The Board
concluded that if the union had dissuaded the employer from his impend-
ing decision, the employer would not have been required to adhere to the
executory contract. The employer bargained in good faith on every issue
requested by the union, whose primary concern was the effect of subcon-
tracting rather than the actual decision itself."0 The case, therefore,
would indicate both a cure by the employer and a waiver by the union.
To cure a pending violation, however, an employer must bargain in
good faith to impasse, after which he may carry out his plan.80 The em-
ployer cannot conceal his true intentions,8' and must supply the union
with all relevant cost, efficiency and feasibility studies related to the pro-
posed operational change."
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Various solutions to the conflict between the Board and the courts have
been offered but thus far none has been adopted. It would seem, there-
76. 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), modified per curiam, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 763, rehearing denied, 318 U.S. 801 (1943).
77. Id. at 407. For similar waiver cases recently decided, see Gladwin Indus., Inc., 183
N.L.R.B. No. 36 (June 12, 1970); Green Constr. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (Jan. 7, 1970).
78. 145 N.L.R.B. 1572 (1964).
79. See also Southern Cal. Stationers, 162 N.L.R.B. 1517 (1967).
80. See, e.g., Assonet Trucking Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 350 (1965). In this case the employer
unlawfully terminated a night shift, and the Board ordered reinstatement with back pay.
81. See Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced per curtam, 305 F.2d
825 (3d Cir. 1962); Royal Optical Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 64 (1962); Mount Hope Finish-
ing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954).
82. Keller Indus., Inc., 170 NL.R.B. No. 197 (April 23, 1968).
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fore, that unless the Board is merely to find a "waiver" or a "cure" when-
ever it does not wish to require bargaining, a resolution of the problem is
in order. Solutions which have previously been proposed are discussed in
this section.
A. The Pseudo-Solutions.
1. The Management Prerogative Solution
This solution is actually a restatement of the courts' point of view.
Briefly, it proposes that the conflict between the courts and the Board be
resolved by simply not requiring decision-bargaining at all. As has been
pointed out by a former Assistant General Counsel for the Board, manage-
ment's argument is that the requirement of bargaining is futile: that
efficiency, strategy and policy are the sole responsibility of management.
Another commentator has stated:
The requirement of advance notification to and discussion with the union inevitably
slows action, and delay itself may block the change. The possibility that confidential
plans, like those for a plant relocation, may become public information may make
the contemplated action impractical. More important, such advance discussion effect-
ively opens the possibility to the union of blocking, delaying, or modifying the con-
templated action by threat or use of economic pressure. . . . Concessions and
compromises may be made which would not otherwise be made. From the immediate
viewpoint of the affected employees and the union, of course, such ability to forestall
action is exactly the effect desired, but it must be recognized that it restricts the
ability of the individual enterprise to achieve optimum operating results and the ability
of the economy as a whole to adjust to changing conditions.
Thus, a union which is interested in fully exploiting the possibilities of the Board's
new doctrine may be able to elevate its status to that of a co-manager whose views
and proposals must be solicited and considered in connection with every decision
which might affect the employment relationship.84
Still another writer, a former chairman of the Board, suggests that the
requirement of decision-bargaining runs counter to the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining. He notes:
Logically and in fact actually every business decision of any substance will directly
or indirectly affect employee welfare. Decisions as to what to produce, how to finance
the company, whether a company should expand, and, if so, into what fields, what to
invest in research and what dividends should be paid to stockholders, the price of the
product, are decisions traditionally entrusted to owners and managers, but their
individual and cumulative effects on employee welfare cannot be gainsaid85
83. Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 Lab. L.J. 143
(1968). See also Loomis & Herman, Management's Reserved Rights and the NLRB-An
Employer's View, 19 Lab. L.. 695 (1968).
84. Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 Duke L.J. 1, 9-10.
85. Farmer, Bargaining Requirements in Connection with Subcontracting, Plant Removal,
Sale of Business, Merger and Consolidation, 14 Lab. L.J. 957, 960 (1963).
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The author then concludes:
The hallmark of a strong economy is its adaptability to an ever-changing economic
world. The paralysis and apparent inhibition on decision-making evident in the railroad
industry are at odds with the national goal of productive growth in an increasingly
competitive world market.80
While these pseudo-solutions, or criticisms as they really are, do have
some validity, they are neither pragmatic nor timely. Surely employees
who devote their careers to an employer should not be dismissed at the
sole discretion of that employer. Stability of labor relations would in no
manner be aided by a regression, for the time has long since passed when
management could make decisions without consulting the union. It ap-
pears somewhat incongruous to permit unions to bargain over wages but
not over plant removal. Wage-bargaining becomes somewhat of a nullity
when there is no employer to pay the wages.8 7 Management has lived suc-
cessfully with Fibreboard, and it can learn to live with bargaining over
other issues.88 Allowing management an unfettered right is contrary to the
purpose of the National Labor Relations Act and disregards the necessary
balancing of interests which the Supreme Court has ordered.8"
2. The Union Equality Solution
While the previous solution suggests that management have a free hand,
unions have urged that they be consulted on all issues which affect em-
ployment. This has been the position of the Board with respect to partial
termination or removal and has often proved to be an exercise in futility.
Employees are not skilled in the management of a business. They are
essentially a medium for obtaining the goals of their employer, and they
should not have the unrestrained right to block managerial decisions in-
herent in permitting them to require bargaining on all business questions.
Such a requirement would certainly impede production. The alternative,
however, is not to preclude decision-bargaining. A happy medium and a
balancing of interests must be reached.
86. Id. at 967.
87. It has been argued that the collective bargaining agreement itself impliedly pro-
hibits removal. See Comment, Labor Agreements-Implied Limitations on Plant Removal
and Relocation, 1965 Duke L.J. 546 (and cases cited therein).
88. It has, however, been suggested that decision-bargaining might imperil the collective
bargaining process. Adams & Coleman, Can Collective Bargaining Survive the Board?, 52
Geo. L.J. 366 (1964). For a discussion of how the duty to decision-bargain Is fulfilled, see
Sigal, The Evolving Duty to Bargain, 52 Geo. LJ. 379 (1964).
89. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 US. 203 (1964).
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B. Alternwtive Solutions
1. The Limited Duty Solution
Because of the negative effects that decision-bargaining may have on
the production process, it has been urged that the bargaining requirement
be limited.?0 Thus it has been suggested:
[Tihe employer's duty to bargain should be satisfied by a reasonable period of frank
discussion with a union fully informed of the existing economic factors, without the
need to proceed to impasse; after discussion the employer should be free to undertake
all measures necessary for efficient relocation. This result could also be reached by
sympathetic administration of the rules for determining what constitutes an impasse
in bargaining about relocation in cases where the employer actively seeks to relocate;
ordinary rules could still be applied to regular bargaining sessions, since prolonged
discussion would then create no unusual hardship.91
During this period of limited bargaining, it is suggested, the employer
would be prohibited from contracting for relocation. -
This limited duty is really nothing more than an abolition of any
decision-bargaining. The only restriction on the employer is that he is not
permitted to make arrangements for relocation during the period of
limited bargaining. He need only move up the timetable for the limited
bargaining and, once that technicality is passed, relocation may begin.
The union is completely without remedy as the employer does not have to
accept even beneficial solutions. In other words, only effect-bargaining
would be required. Thus the limited duty solution actually offers no more
hope for a resolution of the Board-court conflict than do the pseudo-
solutions previously discussed.
2. The Capital Investment Solution
This solution proposes that where the contemplated change involves
an investment or a withdrawal of capital, only effect-bargaining should
be required.9 3 It apparently has its genesis in the Fibreboard decision,
where the Court noted that " [n] o capital investment was contemplated""4
by the change and, as indicated previously, may one day become the
law of the land if the Supreme Court is given the opportunity to decide
the issue. However, as the author admits, "[t]he line between 'employ-
90. See Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1100, 1103-06
(1964).
91. Id. at 1104-05.
92. Id. at 1105.
93. See Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain About Subcontracting and Other 'Man-
agement" Decisions, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 294 (1964).
94. 379 U.S. at 213.
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ment' and 'investment? decisions may often be obscure.""5 This obscurity
would make for complicated bargaining. The union would argue that the
decision involved no capital investment, while the employer could easily
invest capital for the sole purpose of meeting this requirement.
Assuming, however, that a line could be drawn, the employees' rights
would not be safeguarded. The more the employer spent, the less strength
the union would have. Large corporations could rid themselves of unions
while small companies would be required to bargain instead of investing
capital.
Even assuming good faith on the part of the employers, the investment
of capital should not be used as a means to curtail employee rights. While
it is true that employers invest capital, employees often invest their lives
in a trade or company. One man's livelihood should be as valuable as an-
other man's capital.
3. The Advanced Planning Solution
The advanced planning solution is, in theory, quite simple. When the
parties negotiate the collective bargaining agreement they should, accord-
ing to this solution, negotiate their respective obligations concerning re-
moval or partial termination. If this were possible, no mid-contractual
problems would arise.08 The solution, however, may be impractical.
Bargaining is extremely difficult when neither party knows the actualities
of the situation. The union cannot present alternative solutions to the
employer when it does not know the employer's intentions. Moreover,
problems arise during the course of the contract that are unforeseeable.
The employer may find a mid-contractual need to remove, or there may
be a sudden decrease in the sale of a product which calls for a partial
termination. Such problems, because they are unforeseeable, cannot be
bargained over. On the other hand, the union may feel that it has more
leverage at the time of contract negotiations than it might have in the
future. Consequently, it should demand protection against a removal
or a partial termination. The protection, however, will most likely be
limited to some amount of severance pay and, as a result (except for the
presence of other contractual provisions), the union will have sold its
right to decision-bargain.
Thus, the only real solutions that can be reached at the time of con-
tractual negotiations are either a specific management prerogative clause
with a predetermined amount of severance pay or a specific clause im-
95. Comment, supra note 93, at 313.
96. See Comment, The Duty to Bargain Before Implementing Business Decisions, 54
Calif. L. Rev. 1749 (1966); Comment, Changes in Employer Structure and Operations and
Their Effect on Collective Bargaining Rights, 15 De Paul L. Rev. 117, 130 (1965).
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posing a duty to bargain. These solutions in actuality are nothing more
than a waiver by the union97 or a written agreement to do what the Board
already requires. Thus, unfortunately, this solution is in reality not much
of a solution at all.
4. The Relevancy Test Solution
The relevancy test solution would require bargaining only when the
employer's motivation for the operational change is relevant to the union. 8
If the employer terminated for lack of product demand bargaining would
be ineffective and hence unnecessary. If, however, cost efficiency was the
motivation, the union might be able to reduce costs and hence bargaining
would be required.99
To require bargaining only where it can accomplish something would
appear to be a logical solution. As has been pointed out, however, "it may
not be clear which factors underlie a particular decision [and,] [c]on-
sequently, bargaining should be required where it is possible that labor
costs or related matters are involved."10 While it is true that impasse
might be quickly reached if labor costs or related matters were not in-
volved, the problem would be to define "related matters." Assume, for
example, that the motivation for the termination of the plant is a decline
in demand for the product. Under this solution, bargaining would not be
required. It is possible, however, that if labor costs were lowered the price
of the product could also be lowered, thereby increasing demand. Business
decisions are infrequently based upon one factor alone. For example, in
Sucesion Mario Mercado E Hijos,10° the employer unilaterally shut down
and subcontracted because of mechanical difficulties. The Board dis-
missed a complaint alleging violation of section 8(a) (5) because "the
factors which led to the [employer's] decisions to subcontract and to
terminate... are not 'peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collec-
tive bargaining framework.' 1'n1- While the decision is correct, Board pro-
97. See text accompanying notes 67-77 supra.
98. See Comment, The Scope of Collective Bargaining, 74 Yale L.J. 1472 (1965). See
also Comment, The Development of the Fibreboard Doctrine: The Duty to Bargain Over
Economically Motivated Subcontracting Decisions, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (1966).
99. See Comment, The Scope of Collective Bargaining, 74 Yale L.J. 1472, 1478 (1965).
For a view that plant removal based purely on wage considerations is a violation of section
8(a) (3), see Sheinkman, Plant Removal Under the National Labor Relations Act: Can
Bargaining Be Avoided and Should Bargaining Be Avoided?, 16 N.Y.U. Conf. on Lab. 81
(1963).
100. Comment, supra note 99, at 1478.
101. 161 N.L.R.B. 696 (1966). See also NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F2d 698
(10th Cir. 1969) (termination for economic reasons); A.C. Rochat Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 421
(1967) (partial termination due to religious motivation).
102. 161 N.L.R.B. at 699-700 (quoting Fibreboard).
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ceedings were required to establish the fact that the union was incapable
of assisting management in its problem. Since it is the union's duty to
protect the jobs of its members,0 3 it will file an unfair labor practice
charge if there is any possibility that the decision may be related to labor
matters. Indeed, it should file even where there is no such possibility for
it may bring about a more beneficial severance agreement.
Thus, while this solution is logical, it would breed litigation and uncer-
tainty."4 What is required is a solution under which both parties can
predetermine whether decision-bargaining is required.
VI. A PROPOSED APPROACH
The present Board solution is to require decision-bargaining in prac-
tically all cases of removal or partial termination unless there has been
a waiver by the union. Management argues that this impedes production
and can have no beneficial effect when the motivation is other than labor
related. Unions, on the other hand, argue that it is their duty to protect
the jobs of their members. °5 A solution is thus required that includes the
relevancy test'00 but allows for a predetermination by the parties that
bargaining is required. Of course, no solution can be propounded that will
bring success in every situation. As the Supreme Court has indicated,
however, a solution which forces the parties to proceed voluntarily with-
out direct Board pressure is desirable.10 7 Such a solution can be found by
taking a middle ground between the positions of the Board and the
courts.
Decision-bargaining should be required in all cases where the employer
plans to substitute non-unit workers for unit workers. Thus, bargaining
would always be required where there is a removal in the offing. In cases
of partial termination bargaining would be required only when the em-
ployer planned to purchase the goods or services previously being pro-
duced by the unit employees from independent contractors or from an-
other company. The employer would always have to notify the union of
the impending change and give it sufficient information to show whether
or not a substitution was planned. 08
103. Platt, supra note 83, at 144.
104. See Adelstein, The Role of Collective Bargaining in Decisions to Change Operations,
17 W. Res. L. Rev. 1221, 1250-52 (1966).
105. See Platt, supra note 83, at 144.
106. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
107. Cf. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
108. "Planned" means planned at the time of the removal or partial termination. How-
ever, the employer should not be allowed to circumvent the solution by waiting a short
period of time before making a substitution. In all cases, of course, the employer would
have to effect-bargain.
[Vol. 39
PLANT RELOCATION
An example will clarify the solution:
Jones, Inc. (the employer) produces fork lifts for use in heavy in-
dustry. The company owns four plants which manufacture bodies, engines,
tires and automatic transmissions respectively. For purely economic rea-
sons the employer decides the following changes are necessary:
(a) The plant which manufactures the engines will be moved to South
Carolina, and the engines will be shipped to the assembly point. Since
this substitutes South Carolina workers for unit workers bargaining will
be required. The same result would occur if the employer moved its entire
operation to South Carolina.109
(b) The plant which manufactures the tires will be terminated, and
tires will be purchased from Goodyear, Inc. Bargaining will be required in
this situation also because Goodyear employees are being substituted for
the employer's unit employees.
(c) The plant which manufactures automatic transmissions will be
closed down and automatic transmissions will no longer be offered as
optional equipment on the fork lifts. No bargaining will be required be-
cause no substitution of employees will occur. The same result would oc-
cur if the employer decided to terminate its entire operation and go out
of business. 10
Bargaining in the above situations should present no new difficulties to
the employer. In fact, the employer will be relieved of the duty to bargain
where no substitution of employees is planned. Moreover, bargaining in
cases involving substitution is really no different from bargaining in cases
of subcontracting. There seems to be very little logical difference between
Fibreboard (subcontracting) and removal or partial termination with
substitution. What distinction can be made, from the point of view of the
employee, whether the substitute employees appear because of subcon-
tracting or removal or partial termination? Indeed, the line of distinction
between partial termination and subcontracting is at best obscure. For
example, is it subcontracting or partial termination when the employer
gives unit work to outside employees, causing an indefinite layoff of the
unit workers?
From the employer's point of view, there may be a distinction between
109. If the employer's decision to move were non-labor motivated (eg., lack of sufficient
electric power), bargaining would be both required and ineffective. In such a circumstance,
therefore, labor would gain nothing from the required bargaining.
110. If the transmissions were being discontinued because of high labor costs, bargaining
would not be required but might be effective. As indicated before, however, no solution will
be a panacea. Pragmatically, it is believed that the proposed approach will result in the
broadest possible application and success.
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subcontracting and removal or partial termination with substitution. The
motivation, however, is the same: efficiency. If management disagrees
with this solution, it should at least recognize that the solution is in fact
relatively less extreme than the Board's position for it eliminates bargain-
ing where there is no substitution. To require no decision-bargaining at all
is contrary to the policy of the National Labor Relations Act. At the same
time, labor should realize that the purpose of the Act is to grant workers a
right rather than to disable employers.
It is submitted that this solution is consistent not only with the pur-
poses of the Act, but also with Fibreboard and Darlington. Decisions
which concern "the basic scope of the enterprise,""' that is, whether or
not to go out of business (Darlington) or partially go out of business, will
still not be within the scope of the bargaining duty. At the same time,
where these decisions cause a detrimental effect on the union workers and
where the union may be able to dissuade the employer (Fibreboard), bar-
gaining will be required. An equitable balancing of interests will have
been approached.
VII. CONCLUSION
As stated so eloquently by John Kenneth Galbraith: "The first requisite
for survival by the technostructure is that it preserve the autonomy on
which its decision-making power depends."" 2 Autonomy, however, like
every other requisite, must be guided by the needs of society. One of these
needs is the preservation of jobs and the certainty of income. Where
decisions are rendered, whether by the Board or the courts, without re-
gard to the respective interests of both management and unions, neither
side is well served. Thus the Board-court conflict which exists today
makes nobody happy. Only a solution which balances the interests of both
management and labor can produce the tranquil and progressive economy
which is the goal of the National Labor Relations Act. It is submitted that
in cases of removal or partial termination, requiring decision-bargaining
only where there is a substitution of employees carries out that purpose.
111. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLPB, 379 U.S. 203, 225 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
112. J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State 167 (1967).
